Slovakia’s national cybersecurity watchdog has discovered hidden backdoors in 279 speed cameras that were purchased with EU funding and deployed across the country, confirming they are rebranded Russian-made devices with remote-access capabilities tied to hardcoded Russian phone numbers.
The National Security Authority (NBU) issued a formal security alert after its technical analysis of NERO R-ONE high-speed traffic cameras revealed an undocumented module linked to 12 Russian telephone numbers originating from the St. Petersburg and Kemerovo regions. According to the agency, this backdoor mechanism can execute malicious code received via SMS from those numbers, granting full remote control over the devices.
Cameras Purchased Through Shell Company
The cameras were acquired as part of a 30 million euro EU-funded project to rebuild Slovakia’s national traffic monitoring system. The Interior Ministry purchased and installed the devices through a no-bid direct contract with Sodasus, a Cyprus-registered shell company that presented fake certifications. Multiple reports in Slovak media initially raised concerns about the cameras’ origins before the NBU launched its investigation.
NBU’s technical report confirmed the cameras are a rebranded version of the CORDON PRO.M model produced by St. Petersburg-based Russian firm Semicon. Beyond the backdoor system, the analysis revealed that the cameras have their SecureBoot security feature disabled, meaning firmware origin is never enforced. The web management portal contains multiple critical vulnerabilities, and the cameras expose live video streams to anyone without a password who knows the broadcasting IP address.
This is a completely concrete example of how Russia uses technology that it sells for spying.
Peter Bator, a cybersecurity expert, told local media that the risk is enormous, noting that Russia has previously accessed speed and surveillance cameras in Ukraine to help plan military attacks and assess their results. The Interior Ministry initially denied the cameras were of Russian origin and claimed there was no risk of data theft, but Prime Minister Robert Fico dismissed the threat entirely, suggesting that military satellites could read text from orbit.
Deployment Paused as Opposition Demands Accountability
Camera deployment has been paused pending further review, but opposition lawmakers are demanding the replacement of Interior Minister Matús Sutaj Estok. Progressive Slovakia obtained the NBU’s assessment through a freedom-of-information request after initially being denied the details. The findings create political embarrassment for Fico’s government, which has maintained an accommodating stance toward Moscow.
Security analysts have highlighted that the combination of SMS-based command execution, hardcoded foreign phone numbers, disabled firmware verification, and passwordless live streams represents a comprehensive compromise of what should be a civilian traffic infrastructure system. The incident echoes broader concerns about European governments inadvertently deploying compromised hardware from adversarial nations into critical infrastructure networks.
Sources: Cybernews; Slovak Spectator; Risky Bulletin; NBU Slovakia
discussion